Introduction
China was the first major economy to emerge from the global financial crisis, and it did so in spectacular fashion. After a brief -though sharp -downturn in 2008, the Chinese economy grew by 8. In relative terms, this was the biggest stimulus package in the world, equal to three times the size of the United States effort.
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Following Premier Wen Jiabao's call to make the stimulus "big, fast and effective", the programme was implemented with great force and in record time. Along with the huge fiscal injection, state-owned banks opened their spigots, and total credit grew by more than one-third in 2009. Local government inputs also far surpassed expectations.
Altogether the total stimulus grew to an estimated 27% of GDP, with an injection of 19% in 2009 alone.
One obvious inference to draw from this bold stimulus programme and the economy's quick recovery is that China has a strong, rich and effective public sector. This was indeed the one described by George Soros, who said admiringly at a network meeting of his Soros Foundation-supported Open Society Institute in mid-2010 that "the Chinese government works better than ours (in the United States)". This assessment is incontrovertible if the metric used is solely that of economic growth and of how quickly China returned to its high growth path; but the performance through the crisis looks weaker when a broader metric is used. First of all, once unleashed, the stimulus appeared to spin quickly out of control. Investment in fixed assets jumped to 66% of GDP in 2009, and infrastructure investment leaped to more than 18% of GDP, raising immediate concerns about the economy's absorptive capacity and the care with which projects were selected and implemented.
Indeed, by mid-2009 many policy makers and observers in China had begun to worry about the nature of the growth brought by the stimulus programme and its by-products.
The big ramp-up in easy credit, for example, helped to fuel an asset bubble that sent prices of land and housing steeply upward, more than doubling in some big cities during 2009.
The heavy pace of local investment was causing worries about rising local government debt. By early 2010, the government was sufficiently alarmed to call for an immediate freeze and audit of local government investment corporations, and by year-end the urgent problem for macro management had shifted decisively to slowing growth and tamping down inflationary pressures. At this writing in mid-2011, controlling inflation is now the top priority task for the government this year.
This article analyses the fiscal stimulus and related measures applied in the People's Republic of China in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis, and links them to issues of governance to draw some insight on China's reform needs going forward.
Section 2 starts with a "scene setter" discussion of the fiscal and economic situation in China prior to the onset of the economic and financial crisis and of how the government shaped the crisis response. Section 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the fiscal stimulus measures applied. Section 4 reviews the implementation of the fiscal stimulus measures through 2010, and examines the responses of local governments on the demand side, and the financial sector on the supply side, to explain the overheated outcome.
Section 5 concludes with observations on China's exit strategy and on the reform challenges ahead for strengthening macro management in China.
Backdrop to the stimulus: the economic and fiscal situation
Through its transition to a market economy, China has achieved a remarkably long and sustained growth, and has emerged over the past few years as a global economic power. In 2009, it surpassed Germany to become the largest exporting nation, and in 2010 it passed Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world. These achievements came perhaps earlier than expected, partly as a result of the global economic slowdown that began in 2007 and ensnared virtually all countries, but from which China's remarkably quick recovery helped propel it past the others.
But China did not escape being hit hard by the economic crisis. The effect was first felt in the export sector, when world markets collapsed and exports fell precipitously. This downturn can be seen in the quarterly statistics on export growth ( Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 tough year" ahead, as government revenues plunged 17.1% that month from a year earlier (Xinhua, 2009) . Given the importance for government legitimacy of maintaining high rates of growth, policy makers became alarmed and determined to do everything necessary to reverse the trend.
The fiscal cushion
Against this backdrop, the government's determination to move decisively to counteract the effects of global economic slowdown was emboldened by two considerations. First, in 1998 it had intervened with a fiscal stimulus programme that was widely credited with success in helping China stave off contagion in the Asian financial crisis (World Bank, 1999) . Second, unlike the first time -when the fiscal stimulus was rolled out while government finances were still fragile -China's fiscal status was far stronger in 2008. 2 Since the 1994 fiscal reform, China has rebuilt its revenue mechanism, and the new tax system has proven quite buoyant. With rapid economic growth bringing in robust revenues, government coffers were overflowing, with the budget controlling a bigger share of a much larger GDP. Moreover, throughout the transition period, the government has managed its fiscal stance prudently, keeping budget deficits to less than 1% of GDP in most years. On the eve of the global financial crisis, the national debt was small (about 19% of GDP), leaving the government plenty of scope for decisive action.
The stimulus package
Although most of the public attention has been focused on the "CNY 4 trillion stimulus programme", the total package of stimulus measures actually comprised four main components: an investment programme, accommodative monetary policies, tax cuts, and measures to ease the burden on state-owned enterprises.
The investment programme
The CNY 4 trillion "programme" refers to the investment component, which was officially announced by Premier Wen Jiabao on 5 November 2008 as a set of investments totaling CNY 4 trillion, to be spent over 27 months from the fourth quarter of 2008 through 2010. The programme would be focused on seven priority areas:
1. Transport and power infrastructure (railroads, roads, airports, electricity grids).
2. Earthquake reconstruction.
3. Rural village infrastructure.
4. Environment, energy efficiency and carbon emission reduction.
5. Affordable housing.
6. Technological innovation and restructuring.
7. Health and education.
The weighting of these components went through some adjustments during the first months of implementation. Their final distribution is presented in Table 1 . These investments represent new budgetary spending, although some were already plannedsuch as the CNY 1 trillion on post-earthquake reconstruction, whose implementation would be accelerated under the stimulus programme.
For these investments, the central government committed at the outset to funding CNY 1.18 trillion from the budget, with the remaining CNY 2.8 trillion to be financed by local governments, enterprises and banks. 
Accommodative monetary policies
In 2008, China was in the second year of a contractionary monetary policy regime aimed at slowing the 11-12% rate of growth over the previous years and reining in inflationary pressures. Faced with the sudden global economic meltdown and the threat of contagion to China, policy makers made an abrupt shift during the second half of 2008, to ease into an increasingly accommodative policy regime. In September, the central bank reduced the one-year lending rate from 7.47% to 5.58% (China Daily, 2008) . In the period from September through December, interest rates were cut five times, with a cut of 108 basis points on 26 November 2008 (Areddy, 2008) . To give an added boost to the financial sector, in December the State Council released a nine-step plan for financial reform. The package included new credit mechanisms for small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a broader scope for issuing corporate bonds, and new regulations for the creation of real estate investment trust funds (REITs) and private equity (PE) funds (Li et al., 2008) . Also in December 2008, the State Council issued a document authorising a loan allocation of an additional CNY 100 billion to the policy banks. Commercial banks were urged to increase lending. The credit quota was abolished, and a call was issued to strive for increasing total lending by CNY 4 trillion in 2008 (State Council Office, 2008 ). As will be seen below, these liberalising steps together created the conditions for an overwhelming response to the call to stimulate the economy.
Tax cuts
In addition, the government cut taxes, sometimes through accelerating the rollout of some planned reforms. These included: increasing VAT rebates on exports; reducing taxes on small firms by cutting the tax rate from 6% to 3%; and raising the threshold for the tax levy on monthly income from CNY 5 000 to CNY 10 000. The conversion of the value-added tax from an investment-type VAT to a consumption-type VAT, which had been "forthcoming" for much of a decade, 3 was finally rolled out on 1 January 2009. With this reform, firms can now deduct purchases for investment as well as for current operations.
Given the high proportion of investment in GDP, this change represented a significant cut in VAT revenues, by perhaps CNY 150 billion. 4
Bailing out and easing up on state-owned enterprises
To help state-owned enterprises (SOEs) weather the crisis, the government began to provide subsidies to the weaker firms through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which has management responsibility over SOEs and collects dividends from them. In November, the SASAC at the central level injected funds into two airlines (China Southern and China Eastern) using its own funds. 5 In addition, SASACs at all levels were encouraged to reduce remittance requirements from their subordinate SOEs, and bailouts were undoubtedly provided to other SOEs. No figures have been reported for the overall size of these changes, but Premier Wen Jiabao has said that the combination of reduced claims on profit of state-owned enterprises and reductions in taxes and fees would put CNY 500 billion into the hands of enterprises (Wen, 2008 ).
Implementation
Implementation began in the fourth quarter of 2008 under a sense of great urgency that pervaded the top policy circles and emanated from the top leaders on down. 6 The CNY 4 trillion stimulus programme was announced with great fanfare and was quickly Table 2 . From the start, the emphasis was on the timely and full disbursement of funds, and for all projects to start by the third quarter of 2009. With three-quarters of all investment projects assigned to local governments (see, for example, Xiao, 2009, and Huo et al., 2009) , the worry was whether local governments would be able to raise the co-financing needed to meet their counterpart funding requirements in a timely fashion. In 2010, the central government made an additional appropriation of CNY 572.2 billion -perhaps to offset the lagging local government inputs -to bring the disbursement to CNY 992.7 billion for the year (Li, 2010) .
Altogether, the central government input to the stimulus totaled CNY 1.6 trillion (36% larger than the CNY 1.18 trillion envisioned at the start).
Response from local governments 7
China's fiscal system is highly decentralised (see, for example, World Bank, 2002, and Wong, 2007) . The vast majority of responsibilities for providing public services are assigned to sub-national governments, and the central government accounts for less than one-fifth of national budgetary expenditures -a share that has fallen steeply over the past decade ( Figure 6 ). 8 The provision of infrastructure also mainly falls to local governments, and they have accounted for 70-75% of budgetary expenditures on fixed investment in recent years for which data are available.
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The fiscal stimulus programme was likewise to be largely implemented by local governments, and they embraced it with frenzied enthusiasm. Although the central government did not spell out in detail the division of responsibilities for undertaking and financing the stimulus investments, anecdotal evidence indicates that the usual rules were applied both for the assignment of projects and for cost sharing between central and local governments (see, for example, Xiao, 2009, and Huo et al., 2009) .
Under the "normal process", the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible for formulating the national investment plan and approving the list of projects to be included. With guidance from the NDRC on priority areas in which funding is available, local governments (and central ministries) prepare project lists to be submitted each year for inclusion in the national investment plan. Once chosen, a project becomes eligible for budgetary funding as well as bank credit, which is available only for approved projects.
While local governments and ministries compete for national investment funds, the competition is constrained by the availability of funding at localities, since virtually all projects implemented by local governments require counterpart funding, the proportions of which vary by sector and by region. For example, school construction requires a onethird contribution from local governments, and for low-cost housing the central input is a flat rate of CNY 300 per square metre for the central provinces and CNY 400 for the western provinces. 10 Eligibility for application usually requires proof of funding availability from the local government. To be eligible for bank credit, the banks also require proof of requisite own funding in the form of equity or paid-in capital (usually 25-35%).
With the fiscal stimulus programme, the available pool of central funding was vastly expanded, but the goal for quick implementation of the ambitious investment programme required the NDRC to be especially vigilant in ensuring that projects would be allocated only to local governments that have sufficient funds to meet co-financing needs. From the outset, the worry was that with three-quarters of the projects assigned to localities, local governments would struggle to meet this burden of counterpart funding. of local governments, and stipulated an accelerated disbursement of the funds to the provinces (Han and Luo, 2009a) . The ostensible purpose of this bond issue was to be a first step toward allowing local governments to raise debt for funding capital investments. Until an institutional framework is installed to monitor and control local debt issue, the government has chosen to issue the debt centrally, through the Ministry of Finance, but under the names of recipient provinces. Ministry spokespersons explained that these funds "should mainly be used in public infrastructural projects for the provision of public goods … and not for enhancing recurrent expenditures" (Han and Luo, 2009b The local government financial platforms (difang zhengfu rongzi pingtai) referred to in the 2009 document jointly issued by the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission are commonly called local investment corporations (LICs). Since the late 1980s, local governments -mostly at the municipal and provincial levels -have been creating corporate entities to undertake the task of raising funds to finance public investment, and they are variously called urban development investment corporations (UDICs), highway or transport corporations, and the like. These corporations were an innovation to allow local governments to work around a central contradiction in the intergovernmental fiscal system in China, under which local governments are assigned the primary responsibility for the provision of public services including infrastructure but are not given the right to borrow, nor are they assigned enough revenues to take on this responsibility. LICs were initially created as financially independent, single-purpose entities often for the purpose of taking on loans from international financial institutions. Being financially independent restricted their undertakings to those with the capacity for debt servicing and repayment, and LICs were prevalent in the construction and operation of toll roads, power companies, water companies and utilities.
A breakthrough came in 1988, when Shanghai created the first broad-based investment corporation to undertake investment in urban infrastructure, the General Corporation of Shanghai Municipal Property (SMPD), and gave it the mission to co-ordinate and provide for the construction of facilities such as water supply, sewerage, roads, utility hook-ups, etc. To finance these tasks, the corporation was assigned earmarked revenues from the municipal budget and authorised to borrow from banks and to issue corporate bonds (see Figure 7 for a depiction of the corporation's sources and use of funds). Its creation made possible a quantum leap in the financing available for investments in infrastructure to support urban renewal and expansion in Shanghai.
Over time, the model gradually spread to other municipalities, and LICs have come to play a key role in financing urbanisation in many localities. As they became more accepted, they have also evolved to be less strictly financially separated from government, and broadened in scope. Typically, the LICs raise and bundle together bank loans and other financing, using a variety of municipal assets including budgetary and off-budget revenues as equity and collateral. Increasingly, with urbanisation causing an increase in land values, land has become the principal asset backing LICs, and municipal governments have also increasingly relied on off-budget receipts from land lease sales to finance debt service in these LICs.
conditions to organise and build financial platforms, issue corporate debt and mediumterm notes and other financial products, to broaden the channels of funding for providing counterpart funds for central government investment projects". In fact, all of these changes had been outlined by Zhang Ping, Director of the NDRC, at a press conference during the National People's Congress meetings in March 2009, signaling a consensus approval by policy makers at the highest level of government (Zhang, 2009 ). Altogether, these changes greatly expanded the space for local governments, and a dynamic was set up whereby local governments competed fiercely for stimulus investment projects, which represented an unprecedented windfall of funding opportunities for all manner of pet local projects. As a legacy of the planned economy, all local governments and line ministries have medium and long-term plans with project pipelines. Ready or not, many of these projects were quickly rolled out and brought forward, and new projects were hastily put together to meet the calls for new spending in environmental and green technology areas. Within less than a month of the announcement of the stimulus package, local governments, in aggregate, had proposed a staggering total of CNY 18 trillion in investment projects. Soon after, the figure rose further to CNY 25 trillion for the first 18 provinces reporting their plans (Huo et al., 2009 ). 
Response from the financial sector
On the supply side, in answer to the calls from all quarters to support the stimulus effort, China's state-owned banks responded, also with frenzied enthusiasm. The State 1. This figure is equal to the reported deficit of CNY 1 trillion minus set-asides for the Budget Stabilisation Fund and rolled-over commitments. Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; China Data Online; author's estimates.
The perfect storm
But now the stimulus was spinning out of control. Table 3 assembles available This outcome was hardly surprising given the combination of the large fiscal injection, the relaxation of fiscal rules on local government debt, the substantial liberalisation of the financial sector and, especially, the politicisation of the whole stimulus effort. Altogether, these factors created an extraordinarily enabling environment, and it was welcomed by local governments (and ministries) whose incentives were all in favour of expansion. 13 And they were aided by banks -especially state-owned banks that had been told by the government to open their spigots. Loan officers, too, were eager to expand their balance sheets, especially for investments that appear to be essentially risk-free since they are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the government. Sources: China Data Online; author's estimates.
The exit and post-mortem
The stimulus programme worked. It produced growth and jobs, the two ingredients for stability that the top leaders most urgently sought. Growth began to pick up in 2009, accelerating through the year. Quarterly growth rose from 5.3% in Q1 to 5.7% in Q2, 8.6% in Q3 and 13% in Q4 (Figure 3 above) . For the whole year, it reached 8.7% -comfortably above the 8% that has long been considered the minimum required to keep economic problems from spilling over into social problems. This was an impressive achievement in the face of collapsing exports, which had contributed a shocking -3.7% to overall growth in 2009
(equal to -41% of total growth), after falling to 0.8% in 2008 from 2.5% in 2007 (Figure 8 ).
Employment, too, grew robustly. The fear of massive unemployment among migrant workers never materialised, and indeed government officials estimated that aggregate employment grew by 8.5 million in the first three quarters of 2009 and could reach 12 million by year-end (Yang, 2009 ).
But the costs were high. First, all of the growth came from investment which jumped to 66% of GDP, and investment in infrastructure leaped to 18% of GDP. As seen in Figure 2006-10 and 2011-15) , to rebalance the economy toward more consumption and move away from the investment-driven growth model of the past.
Second, in the rush to ensure quick implementation of the stimulus programme, the government went beyond pumping in new fiscal spending and easing monetary policy to changing fiscal rules and liberalising financial regulations. While these changes were on the whole consistent with market reforms, they were sometimes pushed too far and too fast amidst the campaign-style rhetoric coming from both the government and the party urging "support" for the stimulus programme. In the process, much painstaking progress on governance reform was reversed -building professionalism in the banking sector and cleaning up balance sheets, improving budgeting and public investment management, refocusing local governments on public service provision rather than investment, etc.
When combined with the huge spike in easy credit that allowed state-owned enterprises and government agencies (especially at the local levels) to extend their reach, the process has also seen the private sector being squeezed out in some industries and services, reversing the decades-long retreat of the state from economic activities. The fiscal stimulus had been scheduled to be completed by the end of 2010. In fact, even with the unexplained additional injection of CNY 572 billion during 2010, the deficit had fallen to CNY 650 billion (below 2% of GDP) due to strong revenue growth. The 2011 draft budget projects a deficit of CNY 900 billion, but it will be less if, once again, revenues exceed the budgeted amount.
The exit from financial stimulus was more protracted. On 7 January 2010, the central bank raised the discount rate by four basis points. A few days later, it raised the reserve ratio and began open market operations to repurchase CNY 30 billion of bonds over 91 days (Jingji Guanchabao, 2010) . These signals, though, failed to reduce the pace of bank lending.
In the first two weeks in January, new loans totaled CNY 1.1 trillion, equal to the frenetic pace of the blowout first quarter of 2009. An emergency meeting of the monetary policy committee was convened on 18 January, and administrative measures were reportedly adopted at a 22 January meeting of the leadership to enforce credit tightening (Sun et al., 2010) . Although the government denied it, credit quotas were once again rumoured to be enforced. Even so, as seen in Table 3 
Managing local government debt
With More recent estimates, based on findings by the National Audit Office and the central bank, are that the total debt of LICs is likely to have reached CNY 10-14 trillion by year-end 2010 . It is the investment hunger of LICs/local governments that has helped inflate the stimulus programme and push the economy into overheating.
The super-sized stimulus programme has left in its wake a huge run-up in local government debt whose dimensions and potential effects are still not yet known. This is because China has no reliable national figures on local government debt despite a decadelong effort at building a debt-reporting system in the Ministry of Finance. A main reason is that, aside from the bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of local governments, local government debt is primarily accumulated through LICs: investigators at the CBRC estimated that local government debt totalled CNY 11 trillion at the end of 2009, of which LIC debt accounted for CNY 7.38 trillion.
In aggregate terms, the implied level of local government debt (of CNY 15-20 trillion in total 15 ), equal to around 40% of GDP in 2010, is not especially alarming. Servicing the debt, though, may pose problems for local governments, given how highly constrained their budgets are under the present intergovernmental fiscal system where they have no taxing powers and are already straining to meet growing expenditure needs. As a result, the UDIC/ LIC model is heavily reliant on rising land valuations to supply investment funding and debt servicing, but such a revenue source is highly cyclical and volatile. In addition, some localities have taken on far larger debts, and they will be especially vulnerable. The central bank's Tianjin branch, for example, reported that the municipality's LICs doubled their debt in 2009 (Bateson, 2010) .
Equally worrisome for the national government is the extent to which the banking sector is dependent on the LIC loans and their quality. Nation-wide, the People's Bank of China estimates that LICs account for "less than 30%" of all outstanding bank loans, but the degree of exposure varies greatly across banks and regions (Caixin net, 2011) . This share is highest for the China Development Bank, which has had the longest history of lending to systems. At present, the management of public investments is fragmented under the MoF, the NDRC, the State Science and Technology Commission and the MoC, and there is little co-ordination among them. Although the planning system still requires administrative approval for large projects that are above specified thresholds, it applies only to projects that are funded by public funds. Because LICs rely mainly on bank finance, there is no requirement for them to report on either their sources or their uses of funding.
Since mid-2009, the government has been engaged in a massive catching-up exercise, with several regulatory agencies undertaking investigations and surveys of LICs to collect information, including the CBRC, the Audit Office, the Ministry of Finance and the NDRC.
These agencies found numerous and serious problems with LIC loans. The most common were that fiscal guarantees were widely used as backing for the loans in lieu of collateral, and that when land was held as collateral, excessively optimistic valuations were placed on it. In Tianjin, the central bank found that loans backed by traditional collateral accounted for only 22% of the 2009 lending to LICs, while 71% were backed only by guarantees (Bateson, 2010) . Nation-wide, the CBRC reported that 47% of all LIC debt was guaranteed by fiscal revenues, and it classified 26% of LIC debt as "high risk" at midyear 2010 (GaveKal-Dragonomics, 2010).
Reform challenges for macroeconomic management in China
After more than three decades of market-oriented reform, the Chinese economy is highly decentralised, and the central government's ability to direct national policy implementation is attenuated. The stimulus programme was intended to leverage fiscal inputs to produce a much larger effect through mobilising other "social" resources.
However, a decentralised system of investment finance requires a financial sector that has the capacity for appraising the viability of projects and the credit-worthiness of the borrowers. These conditions were clearly absent when the majority of the borrowers were LICs whose financial relationships with local governments are often ambiguous, and when the LICs were allowed to borrow for "bundles" of projects. Moreover, local government finances are themselves extremely complex and non-transparent. Fiscal resources are scattered across several budgetary and extrabudgetary accounts, reporting is incomplete, and there is little co-ordination among them.
The stimulus programme has once again exposed the "Achilles' heel" of China's macroeconomic management: the tendency toward overinvestment that is rooted in the growth orientation and soft budget constraint of state sector agents, including local governments. Hardening the budget constraints requires a system with clearly defined responsibilities and accountability, which are lacking in the current intergovernmental fiscal system. The stimulus programme, its implementation and exit have shown the extent to which the government continues to rely on administrative instruments, alongside indirect/market instruments, to manage the macro economy. The experience has shown both the advantages -quick results -and the disadvantages -inefficiencies and distortions. The use of administrative controls is both a cause and a symptom of the immaturity of markets. To rein in the build-up of local government debt, for example, the government will, in the short term, resort to instituting freezes and caps on LICs, to buy time for building up an appropriate institutional and legal framework for improving their governance.
The bigger challenge, though, is to strengthen governance for the whole public sector to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures and public investment.
Reforming the intergovernmental fiscal system will be a prerequisite to strengthening accountability for the whole sector.
Notes
1. The United States stimulus including temporary tax cuts and increased government spending was worth just over USD 700 billion, or about 5% of GDP, spread over two years.
2. In 1998, government revenues were less than 12% of GDP. In 2008, the level was 19.5%.
